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1 Introduction
Two main events, for many developed countries, once again address the important choices
between several energy sources and energy dependencies. Firstly, at the end of 1997, 160
nations reached an agreement in Kyoto, Japan, to limit their production of carbon dioxide
and other greenhouse gases. Secondly, the recent rise in oil prices. The energy inde-
pendence argument was, at the beginning, one of the two reasons explaining the growth
of nuclear energy production in the USA or France during the sixties and the growth of
Ethanol production in Brazil through the “Pro-alcohol” plan in the seventies. The other
argument was the relatively low price of those alternative energy sources. For example,
in February 2008, the price of Ethanol for Brazilian consumers was 0.769US $ per liter
against 1.443 US $ for petrol. In Brazil, Ethanol became the main substitute for petrol
(85% of cars are flex-fuel in Brazil with the obligation to include 22% of Ethanol per
liter of petrol), mainly due to the low costs of producing Ethanol. Similarly, the nuclear
industry has gradually become the main source of electricity production in France where
the nuclear industry currently covers 86% of French production of electricity and 20% of
the total final energy consumption (Stenzel et al. (2003)).
If we accept Ethanol and nuclear as renewable resources (in the sense of non-depletable
energy which also includes hydro power, wind energy, solar energy, biomass and geother-
mal energy), they are the two, consistent and real, examples of substitution between non-
renewable fossil fuels and renewable energy resources. As said Andre´ and Cerda (2006),
the main reason is certainly that in some situations it is easy, from a technological per-
spective, to replace a non-renewable resource with a renewable one. Indeed, it is relatively
easy to substitute nuclear electricity or biofuels for coal and oil in electricity production
or transportation (IEA (2007a) for electricity production and Harrington and McConnell,
(2003) for transportation). In other cases, the replacement is currently too costly and diffi-
cult to perform (see for example Darmstadter (2001)). This is mainly due to the currently
higher costs of alternative energy sources like solar, hydro or biomass (IEA (2007b)).
In fact, most renewable energy, with the exception of large hydro-electric power, nu-
clear and ethanol, represents a range of technologies still in their infancy. Due to R&D
inputs, learning-by-using and wider commercial application, the capital costs of renew-
able energy are expected to fall substantially, making production from renewable energy
sources increasingly competitive. If we look at our two examples, it is clear that sub-
stitution between renewable and non-renewable resources requires time, money and a
voluntary policy (Steenblik, R. (2003), Oosterhuis, F. (2001)). The Brazilian government,
since 1975, introduced the ”Pro-alcohol” plan which implies substantial subsidies on pro-
duction and for subvention. This, among others, includes the obligation to include 22%
of Ethanol per liter of petrol. As a result we can now see that the productivity of Ethanol
in Brazil is 30% higher compared to other countries (Chade (2006), Guimaraes (2007)).
Research undertaken in the United States provides a useful indicator of the respective
levels of total subsidy support for nuclear power and wind power at similar stages of tech-
nological development. Goldberg (2000) estimates that the nuclear industry in the USA
received about 30 times more support per kWh output than wind power in the first 15
2
years of the industry’s development(EEA (2004)). The comparative advantage of nuclear
power in France stems from early investments with a monopoly structure in production .
These policies, through their impact on the relative price of non-renewable and renew-
able resources, lead to a much larger supply of the otherwise too costly renewable substi-
tute. Setting aside possible effects of these policies on pollution and climate change, then
one of the main reasons for this kind of subsidy policies is the potential learning-by-using
effect. It is clear that a product, when in its infancy of development, can improve fastest
through a sort of improvement process which one might call trial and error. It is however
not clear whether these subsidy policies necessarily provide a socially valuable invest-
ment at these early stages. This question can however be addressed by looking at the
conditions under which a rational policy maker would start to invest in learning-by-using.
The contribution of this article is thus twofold. Firstly, we assess how and when a
costly energy substitute should be substituted for a non-renewable input and under what
conditions this is likely to lead to a sustainable consumption path. Secondly, we address
the impact of learning-by-using on the costs of the energy substitutes and how this is likely
to augment our previous results. With this we also intend to add to the understanding
of potential incentives to induce learning-by-using. We base our analysis on the now
seminal contribution by Dasgupta and Heal (1974) but allow for a costly alternative energy
production which is a perfect substitute for the non-renewable resource.
Our work here is similar to Tahvonen and Salo (2001) but differs in several crucial
aspects. We firstly assume that the extraction of non-renewable resources is costless,
and we secondly assume constant per unit costs of the energy substitute. Though we
lose some generality we gain the advantage of explicit solutions for some stages of the
optimal path. We also believe to obtain some results which seem slightly more realistic.
For example, due to their assumptions they find that both types of resources should be
used simultaneously. What we, in reality, however observe is that renewable resources
like solar and wind energy are only used since they are so strongly subsidized. Indeed,
without that level of subsidies, we would not see any solar or wind energy in today’s
energy production (see e.g. US Department of Energy, (2000)).
In addition, many empirical articles suggest that the use of non-renewable resources
has recently been increasing and is on a rising trend (e.g. Berk and Roberts, (1996)). Our
model predicts that it would be optimal, under certain conditions, to increase the extrac-
tion of the non-renewable resource shortly before one switches to the energy substitute.
This result mainly hinges on the wealth of the nation in question and its valuation of the
future.
The article is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce the model with an ex-
ogenous cost of the substitute and obtain conditions for the resource use, the transition
between resources and the sustainability of consumption. In section 3 we introduce en-
dogenous learning-by-using and compare the results to the exogenous cost case. Section
4 concludes.
3
2 The Model
Our modeling approach here closely follows the basic idea of Dasgupta and Heal (1979)
with several significant changes. We follow Dasgupta and Heal (1979) by assuming the
existence of a representative agent who maximizes his stream of utility subject to a capital
accumulation constraint, where income comes from a non-renewable energy input and
capital. Our extension is that the agent can also make use of a costly energy substitute,
which is a perfect substitute for non-renewable resources in energy production.1 Our
agent therefore solves the subsequent optimal control problem.
max
{C(t),R(t),M(t)}
W =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtu(C(t))dt (1)
subject to
K˙(t) = F (K(t), R(t) +M(t))− C(t)− γM(t), (2)
S˙(t) = −R(t), (3)
C(t), K(t), S(t), R(t),M(t) ≥ 0,
K(0), S(0) given.
Here, consumption at time t is represented by C(t); capital by K(t); the flow of non-
renewable resources by R(t) and the stock thereof by S(t); the costly substitute by M(t)
with a price γ; u(·) is the utility function; ρ > 0 the discount rate and F (K,R+M) is the
production function for capital accumulation. 2 We impose the following assumptions.
Assumption 1: The utility function u : IR+ → IR is at least twice continuously dif-
ferentiable and has the standard properties of u′(C) > 0, u′′(C) < 0 ∀C. We assume
u′(0) = +∞.
Assumption 2: The production function F : IR2+ → IR+ is concave in both arguments
with FK ≥ 0 and FR ≥ 0, and verifies F (0, R +M) = F (K, 0) = 0.
An admissible path is defined as a trajectory {C(t), K(t), R(t),M(t), S(t)}0≥t≥∞ which
meets the constraints (2) and (3) with the states K(t)and S(t) being piecewise continuous
and the controlsC(t),R(t),M(t) piecewise continuous. A path {C(t)∗, K(t)∗, R(t)∗,M(t)∗, S(t)∗, t∗}
is an optimal path if it is admissible and ∀{C(t), K(t), R(t),M(t), S(t), t} admissible
paths we have
∫∞
0
e−ρtu(C(t)∗)dt ≥ ∫∞
0
e−ρtu(C(t))dt. The optimization problem can
be rewritten in Lagrangian form as follows:
L(t) = H(t) + ωR(t)R(t) + ωM(t)M(t),
whereH(t) is the constant value Hamiltonian and given by
H(t) = u(C(t)) + q(t)(F (K(t), R(t) +M(t))− γM(t)− C(t))− λ(t)R(t),
1The costs of this substitute are assumed constant in this section but are endogenized in the section on
technical change.
2We use dx/dt ≡ x˙ and we denote the partial derivative of a function G(x, y) with respect to x by Gx.
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where q(t) is the shadow value of capital and λ(t) the one of the non-renewable resource.
The first order conditions give us
u′(C(t)) = q(t), (4)
q(t)F ′R − λ(t) + ωR(t) = 0, (5)
q(t)(F ′R − γ) + ωM(t) = 0, (6)
−q(t)F ′K = q˙(t)− ρq, (7)
ρλ(t) = λ˙(t). (8)
The complementarity slackness conditions are given by
ωR(t)R(t) = 0, R(t) ≥ 0, ωR(t) ≥ 0,
ωM(t)M(t) = 0, M(t) ≥ 0, ωM(t) ≥ 0.
Finally, the transversality conditions read
lim
t→∞
q(t)K(t)e−ρt = 0,
lim
t→∞
λ(t)S(t)e−ρt = 0,
and, for now, we assume that the utility integral is bounded for any optimal path, such
that W =
∫∞
0
u(C∗(t))e−ρtdt < ∞. Furthermore, both the utility function and the set
of constraints are concave in states and controls, wherefore the Mangasarian sufficiency
conditions are fullfilled. We now analyze the basic properties of this model before we
take a look at the conditions for dynamics and sustainability.
Lemma 1 Given the policy maker’s problem (1), it is never optimal to utilize non-renewable
resources and a costly substitute at the same time.
Assume that R > 0 and M > 0. This implies qFR = λ and FR = γ, which implies
qγ = λ. This condition can only be satisfied if FK = 0, thus if K →∞, which implies a
contradiction.
Even allowing for depreciation will only result in a degenerate set of time points un-
der which both energy inputs will be used simultaneously. This is a direct result of the
assumption of perfect substitutability in energy inputs. This Lemma states that given
the structure of the control problem (1), both energy inputs should never be used si-
multaneously. The reason why we currently see different types of energy inputs being
used simultaneously should then either be due to vintage technologies, such that it is not
feasible to immediately switch from one energy input to another on an aggregate scale;
or because there exists an underlying mechanism which changes the incentive for using
non-renewable and a more costly renewable energy input simultaneously. In section 3 we
propose technical change via learning-by-using as one of possible mechanism which may
lead to the simultaneous use of both energy inputs.
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Lemma 2 Given the policy maker’s problem (1) the non-renewable resource will be used
until it becomes efficient to use the costly substitute, or never at all.
We take the case of R > 0 and M = 0. This implies qFR = λ, q(FR − γ) = −ωM ,
and therefore FR < γ and we obtain a Hotelling rule, FˆR = FK . Since this implies that
FˆR > 0, there exists a T s.th. limt→T FR = γ, which implies that M > 0. The next
case is R = 0 and M > 0. Again, from the Kuhn-Tucker condition we calculate that
qFR + ωR = λ and FR = γ, which implies qγ < λ. Since λˆ > qˆ, we know ∃T ≥ 0 s.th.
qγ < λ and therefore R = 0, M > 0, ∀t.
This result, in essence, boils down to one of comparing relative efficiencies. Do we
still have sufficiently many non-renewable resources in order to meet the energy require-
ments of the current production process? Does the marginal increase in production from
the renewable substitute already cover its costs? For example, Canada obtains currently
over 55% of its electricity from renewable energy inputs, whereas the US obtains the same
amount instead from non-renewable energy (especially coal). With similar economic and
tax structures these differences can thus be explained by price differences in the energy
production. The country which virtually exclusively relies on renewable resources in its
energy generation is Brazil with approximately 90% of its energy generation coming from
renewable energy resources. This is clearly due to the fact that Brazil firstly has an abun-
dance of renewable resources and secondly that they come much more cheaply than non-
renewable inputs. Thus, given that we currently still live in a world where non-renewable
resources are abundant enough to keep production sufficiently high, it is no wonder that so
few countries choose to use the more costly renewable energy sources. Therefore, today,
the two main factors which lead to the choice of non-renewable resources over renewable
ones are simply their relative abundance and their generally lower costs.
Lemma 3 The policy maker will choose R(0) such that when he switches energy inputs
at time t = T , we have S(T ) = 0.
Proof by contradiction. Assume
∫ T
0
S(t)dt < S(0). Since R(t) = 0 ∀t ≥ T , then
S(T ) > 0. But by the transversality condition limt→∞ λS(t)e−ρt = 0, and since λ(t) =
λ(0)eρt where λ(0) > 0, this would imply limt→∞ λ(t)S(t) > 0. Therefore we have a
contradiction which implies S(T ) = 0. 
This result is useful since it shows that the (costless) non-renewable resources should
ideally be fully depleted before one moves on to a costly substitute. Several modifications
ought to augment this basic result. Firstly, if the extraction of non-renewable resources
becomes increasingly costly the further the resource gets depleted. For example, it be-
comes more and more costly to mine the lower layers of coal or to withdraw oil from
remote areas. Secondly, one could generally assume that the non-renewable resource is
polluting and therefore imposes another externality on the agent. In these (non-exclusive)
cases our results would be augmented.
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2.1 Dynamics
We are essentially dealing with a problem that can be separated into two stages. The first
stage with R > 0 has been well studied (e.g. Dasgupta and Heal, 1974), the link between
the first and second stage has been studied in the previous section and the second stage
will be studied here. We know that R > 0, M = 0 before T and R = 0, M > 0 after
T . Since we know that FR(K,M) = γ after some time T , we use the implicit function
theorem to write M = h(K), where h′(K) > 0 if FRR < 0 and FKR > 0. This allows us
to reduce the system to one consisting of two variables only, namely C(t) and K(t).
C˙ = − u
′(C)
u′′(C)
[
FK(K,h(K))− ρ
]
, (9)
K˙ = F (K,h(K))− C − γh(K). (10)
In order to compare to the literature along the lines of Dasgupta and Heal (1979), we
shall from now on focus on the case of a constant-elasticity of substitution production
function.
We are particularly interested in assessing when a costly resource substitute will be
used and whether a costly resource substitute allows for sustainable consumption. Since
this question is most interesting if one assumes the realistic case of energy as an essential
input in production, we shall assume this from now on. We answered the first question
in the previous section and now deal with the second one. Since we know that C˙ =
− u′(C)
u′′(C)
[
FK(K,h(K))− ρ
]
, we know that C˙ > 0 if FK > ρ. From our previous analysis
we know that the costly substitute will be used if FR = γ. We now wish to understand
what kind of production technology allows for both conditions to hold simultaneously.
We shall here take the case of the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production
function, as introduced by Arrow, Chenery, Minhas and Solow (1961), with constant
returns to scale. The CES production function is given by F (K,R + M) = A[αKθ +
(1 − α)(R + M)θ] 1θ . From FR = γ we can then solve for M as a function of K, which
gives
M =
[
α
[ γ
(1−α)A ]
θ
1−θ − (1− α)
] 1
θ
K ≡ ψ 1θK.
Important here is the linearity between M and K. As we can easily calculate, an interior
solution requires γ < (1 − α) 1θA, where we remind that we assume complementarity
between capital and energy input (s.th. θ < 0). This condition is more likely to be satisfied
the lower the cost of the energy substitute; the larger the share of capital in production;
the better the substitution between capital and energy; and the higher the exogenously
given level of technology. Substituting the optimal relationship between M and K into
equation (9) and (10) we obtain
C˙(t) = − u
′(C(t))
u′′(C(t))
[
αA[α + (1− α)ψ] 1−θθ − ρ
]
≡ − u
′(C(t))
u′′(C(t))
[
Φ− ρ], (11)
K˙(t) =
(
A[α + (1− α)ψ] 1θ − γψ 1θ )K(t)− C(t) ≡ ΨK(t)− C(t). (12)
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With some manipulations it can be shown that Ψ > 0 iff γ < (1−α) 1θA. Thus, an interior
solution for M also implies a positive Ψ. The next observation is that an interior steady
state in consumption will only exist in a deteriorate set of parameter configurations, given
by αA[α+ (1− α)ψ] 1−θθ = ρ. We will neglect this possibility in the further analysis. We
now define − cu′′(c)
u′(c) ≡ 1/σ, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, which allows to
retrieve an explicit solution for C(t) and K(t) in terms of exogenous parameters. We find
that ∀t ≥ T , the dynamics are characterized by
C(t) = C(T )eσ
(
Φ−ρ
)
(t−T ), (13)
K(t) = ΣeΨ(t−T ) − C(T )e
σ(Φ−ρ)(t−T )
σ
(
Φ− ρ)−Ψ . (14)
T is determined by the point in time when limt→T FR = γ. For γ sufficiently big we
could have T = ∞, whereas for γ sufficiently small, we would have T = 0. However,
we are more interested in whether consumption can be positive or non-decreasing over
the whole time horizon. A necessary condition for non-decreasing consumption is Φ >
ρ. Comparative static exercises show that Φ increases with increases in A and α but
decreases with a lower γ. Thus, if capital is more important for production or the larger
the (currently) exogenously given level of technology, the more likely will consumption
be non-decreasing. On the other hand, a more expensive costly substitute makes it more
likely to have an unsustainable consumption path. We also obtain the standard result that a
stronger preference towards today increases the likelihood of unsustainable consumption.
In order to study the full system we now need to find Σ. We can calculate its value with
the aid of the transversality condition for capital. The transversality condition limt→∞ q(t)K(t)e−ρt =
0 can be re-written using the results from the first-order condition as well as equations (13)
and (14) for t ≥ T as
lim
t→∞
{
CT
Ψ− σ(Φ− ρ)e
(σ−1)(Φ−ρ)(t−T ) + Σe(Ψ−(Φ−ρ))(t−T )
}
e−ρ(t−T ) = 0. (15)
For the empirically relevant case of σ < 1 we obtain several crucial conditions from the
transversality condition.
Firstly, one may assume that Φ > ρwhich implies positive consumption growth. Then
Σ = 0 is a sufficient condition for the TVC to hold. This impliesK(t) = −C(T )eσ(Φ−ρ)(t−T )
σ
(
Φ−ρ
)
−Ψ
.
Given K(T ) = KT > 0, then C(T ) = (Ψ − σ(Φ − ρ))KT and we require Ψ >
σ(Φ − ρ) for an interior solution. In that case, capital will accumulate according to
K(t) = KT e
σ(Φ−ρ)(t−T ) and consumption will be a constant fraction (Ψ−σ(Φ−ρ))−1 of
capital. In this case we obtain endogenous growth where the energy input is sufficiently
cheap such that enough of it can be produced in order to overcome the ever increasing
energy demands from the increasing production.
Secondly, assume Φ < ρ which implies a continuous decline in consumption over
time. Then Σ = 0 is again a sufficient condition for the TVC to be satisfied since
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σ(Φ − ρ) − Ψ < 0. We again obtain that capital will accumulate according to K(t) =
KT e
σ(Φ−ρ)(t−T ), but this time capital will decline with consumption over time. The re-
newable energy substitute is too expensive to keep capital non-declining.
2.2 Further questions
We have not been able to answer a few crucial questions analytically since it is not pos-
sible to obtain the explicit solution of the first stage of the model when R > 0. Several
questions are therefore still outstanding. Firstly, what determines the switching time?
Secondly, how does the non-renewable resource get depleted?
The switching time
The analytical results show that FR = γ is the switching condition for the non-renewable
resource. It is thus evident that the size of γ is crucial for the switching time. However,
so are the initial values of the stocks K(0) and S(0). Indeed, the agent is required to
build up a sufficient amount of capital in order to satisfy the switching condition. We
therefore simulate the model (we provide a description of the simulation in the Appendix)
in order to understand how both γ and the initial conditions for the state variables affect
the switching time. In terms of the stocks, it suffices to look at only one of them and
we choose K(0) for convenience. Figure 1 shows how the switching time is affected by
changes in γ and K(0).
> Figure 1 about here <
What we observe is that for a large enough initial value of capital and a low enough
cost of the substitute, the stock of the non-renewable resource will be used up completely
in the first period. Furthermore, for a given value of γ, a smaller initial value of the capital
stock implies that the switch is postponed further. For a given initial value of capital, the
switching time is a monotonic, convex function of γ. Also, the smaller is the initial value
of capital the more convex the relationship between γ and the switching time.
In terms of policy implications this suggests that, ceteris paribus, poorer countries
should switch to a costly energy substitute later than richer ones. This is a pure level
effect and does not change the subsequent growth rate of consumption or capital.
The depletion of the non-renewable resource
In the standard Dasgupta-Heal (1974)-Solow (1974)-Stiglitz (1974) model, if the resource
inputs are complements, then the non-renewable resource is monotonically depleted and
its extraction tends to zero over time. However, in this model it is possible that the non-
renewable resource is depleted in a non-monotonic fashion. We provide an analytical
condition in the subsequent proposition and then show a numerical example.
Proposition 1 The non-renewable resource may be depleted non-monotonically if ∃t′
such that for some t′ < T , sign(Ct′/Yt′ − 1 + υ) 6= sign(Ct/Yt − 1 + υ).
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The proof of this uses the first phase of the control problem. We already showed that
Hotelling’s rule holds for t < T , such that FˆR = FK . We can rewrite this as
R˙ =
1
FRR
[
FRFK − FRKK˙
]
.
By the assumption of constant returns to scale in the production function we know that
the elasticity of substitution in a CES function is given by υ ≡ FRFK
FRKF
, with θ ≡ υ−1
υ
. From
the capital accumulation we know that K˙ = Y − C, where Y = F (K,R). Thus, R˙ > 0
if FRFK < FRKK˙, which is equivalent to C/Y < 1− υ. Thus, if there exists an interval
of t′ in the phase where R > 0, ie. for t < T , then the sign of R˙ changes only if there is a
change in the sign of C/Y − 1 + υ, where sign(R˙) = −sign(Ct/Yt − 1 + υ) . 
This result comes about since the agent firstly discounts the future and therefore uses
an initially large but declining amount of the non-renewable resource, and then secondly
wishes to build up a sufficient capital stock in order to satisfy the switching condition.
> Figure 2 about here <
In Figure 2 we show how the non-monotonicity of the non-renewable resource de-
pletion depends on the costs of the energy substitute. For given initial conditions K(0)
and S(0) we notice that the higher is cost of the substitute, the lower will be the non-
renewable resource extraction. Furthermore, the non-monotonicity result does not prevail
for all values of γ. The more costly the substitute the more time is needed to build up
capital and therefore the longer will the non-renewable resource be in use.
2.3 When is consumption sustainable?
An important lesson from this model is the potential non-sustainability of consumption
despite the existence of an energy substitute. It is clear now that this result crucially
hinges on the costs of the energy substitute. Our benchmark calibration in Figures 3 and
4 shows a potential variety of consumption and capital paths for an interior solution of the
energy substitute for different levels of γ.
> Figures 3 and 4 about here <
As can easily be seen, different levels of γ can lead from endogenous growth to en-
dogenous decline. We can easily obtain that the effect of γ on the growth rate of capital
and consumption is negative since dΦ/dγ < 0. Thus, a higher γ implies a lower growth
rate of capital and consumption. One can also calculate that C˙(t) < 0 if
γ > (1− α)A
[
1− α( ρ
αA
)
θ
θ−1
1− α
] θ−1
θ
≡ γ¯, (16)
and C˙(t) ≥ 0 otherwise. Comparative statics with respect to γ¯ show that dγ¯/dρ < 0,
dγ¯/dA > 0, dγ¯/dα < 0. If we furthermore use standard parameter configurations of
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ρ = 0.03, α = 0.3, A > 1, then in the neighborhood of these values we have that
dγ¯/dθ > 0.
Firstly, the higher ρ the lower will be threshold γ¯, implying that less care about the
future requires an even smaller cost of the energy substitute for sustainable consumption.
The parameter ρ can, of course, capture any reason for discounting the future, from uncer-
tainty over cultural reasons to personal characteristics of agents. The intrinsic relationship
revealed here between discounting the future and the costs of the energy substitute sug-
gests that countries with a low life-expectancy are rather likely to be unsustainable (in
comparison to countries with a high life-expectancy) despite the existence of an energy
substitute.
Secondly, for a higher total factor productivity we find that consumption may still be
sustainable with larger costs of the energy substitute. This for example suggests that coun-
tries like the USA or UK, France and Germany, those countries that have a comparatively
high total factor productivity, are able to substitute costly renewable energy inputs at lower
costs and should therefore substitute relatively earlier than most developing countries.
Thirdly, the higher the distribution parameter of capital the lower must be the cost of
the energy substitute in order to obtain a sustainable consumption path. Thus, countries
which are heavily relying on capital in their production function (those countries where
the agricultural sector plays a minor role) will be more likely to see a declining growth
path.
Finally, the easier it is to substitute energy and capital the lower may be the costs of
the energy substitute for long-term growth. Indeed, what we get from this condition is
that the less importance energy has for production the more likely will consumption be
non-declining.
3 Technical Change
From the previous analysis we derive several important results for the sustainability of
consumption and for the shift between non-renewable and renewable energy inputs. The
crucial parameter that we investigated was the cost of the renewable energy substitute,
γ. We took γ as constant and given. However, we also know that the costs of the energy
substitutes like wind or solar energy have significantly decreased over the past years. This
is mostly attributed to learning-by-using or learning-by-doing (Arrow (1962), Bramoulle´
and Olson (2005)). This means that the more one uses of the energy substitute, the more
efficient one becomes in producing and using it and therefore more experience with this
substitute implies a lower cost (see for example Van der Zwaan et al. (2002), Gerlagh and
Van der Zwaan (2003)). We therefore now address the question of whether endogenous
learning-by-using can revert some of the previous results. We are especially interested
in two questions. Firstly, we wish to understand whether there exist circumstances under
which both the non-renewable resource and the costly substitute are used simultaneously.
Our previously analysis has shown that it is, generally, not optimal to use both at the same
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time.3 Our intuition is that we should use the renewable resource directly if we believe
that learning-by-using will reduce the costs of the substitute, but this may depend on how
learning translates into cost reductions. Secondly, we want to know whether learning-by-
using may revert the previous result of unsustainable consumption for sufficiently high
costs of the energy substitute.
3.1 Learning-by-using
The best way to describe learning-by-using is via the so called ’learning curves’, which
explain the price of the energy substitute as a function of the cumulative capacity used
(McDonald and Schrattenholzer (2001), Rubin et al. (2004)).
In the following paragraphs we now extend the previous model to endogenous learning-
by-using. We assume that γ′(B(t)) < 0, γ′′(B(t)) ≥ 0 and B˙(t) = M(t). B(t) therefore
represents cumulative capacity use of M(t). The Langrangian, omitting time subscripts
for convenience, of this problem then becomes
L = u(c)e−ρt + q(F (K,R +M)− c− γ(B)M)− λR + φM + ωRR + ωMM. (17)
The new term is φM which represents the value ofM through its use inB. The first-order
conditions lead to
u′(C)e−ρt = q, (18)
λ˙ = 0, (19)
q˙ = −qFK , (20)
qFR = λ− ωR, (21)
φ˙ = qγ′(B)M, (22)
ωM = q(γ − FR)− φ. (23)
In the next paragraphs we collect a number of results which one can obtain from this
setup.
Result 1 In the case of learning-by-using with a costly energy substitute the energy sub-
stitute will, in general, be used earlier than if costs are exogenously given.
From the Kuhn-Tucker conditions we know that (q(γ(B)− FR)− φ)M = 0. We clearly
start to use the costly substitute much earlier than in the case without learning-by-using,
namely already when FR < γ(B), or q(γ(B) − FR) = φ. In addition, we know that
M = 0 if q(γ(B)− FR) > φ. It seems reasonable to assume γ′(B) > −∞. The shadow
value of B is given by φ(t) = − ∫∞
t
qγ′(B)Mdt > 0. Therefore, the more efficient is the
cumulative capacity use of M in reducing the costs of M through learning-by-using the
3If the energy inputs are not perfect substitutes then in general both may be used simultaneously. We do
not investigate this possibility here.
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larger will be the shadow value of B. A larger shadow value of B implies that the differ-
ence between FR and γ(B) will be greater at the time of the transition to the renewable
energy substitute. Conclusively, those countries that have good learning conditions should
use the energy substitute much earlier than those that have worse learning conditions.
Result 2 Countries which are very poor are less likely to consider the impact of learning.
Assume R > 0 and M = 0. Then q(γ − FR) > φ, which implies γ > FR. In that case
we obtain the usual Hotelling rule, where FˆR = FK > 0. This implies there exists a point
in time after which q(γ − FR) = φ. This condition can be rewritten to
FR = γ +
∫∞
t
q(s)γ′(B(s))M(s)ds
u′(c)e−ρt
.
If the level of consumption is very low, i.e. close to subsistence level, then the representa-
tive agent will ignore the second term and continue to extract the non-renewable resource
until FR ≈ γ. The further consumption is above subsistence level, the more important
will be the second term, and the earlier will the agent start to divert capital to the energy
substitute M . This gives some suggestive policy implications. If one were to continue
this line of thought, then richer countries should provide stronger incentives for using
the energy substitute than poor countries. In a decentralized version of this model one
would therefore expect to see higher incentives for the use of the costly substitute through
e.g. tax and subsidy efforts. In effect, this is a behavior that we are already able to ob-
serve nowadays. It is mostly the rich countries that subsidize renewable energy inputs and
thereby help to drive their costs down.
Result 3 The price of the energy substitute will decline over time.
Assume R = 0 and M > 0. Then we obtain a new Hotelling rule given by
FˆR = FK(1− γ/FR) < 0.
Therefore, if the energy substitute gets used, then the marginal product of the energy
substitute will decrease over time.
Result 4 A balanced growth path may exist with growth characteristics qualitatively
equivalent to those of the exogenous cost model.
The dynamic system of this is then given by
C˙ = − u
′(C)
u′′(C)
(FK − ρ), (24)
M˙ = − 1
FRR
[
FRKK˙ + FK(γ − FR)
]
, (25)
K˙ = F (K,M)− C − γ(B)M, (26)
B˙ = M. (27)
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We calculate the balanced growth path (BGP) for an interior solution ofM(t) for the CES
case. On the BGP we assume that γ′(B) = 0 and therefore constant at γmin. We can then
derive the following system that describes the possible BGP, where we define x = C/K
and y = M/K.
Cˆ = σ
(
A
(
α + (1− α)yθ) 1−θθ − ρ), (28)
Mˆ =
αγminy
1−θ
(1− α)(1− θ) +
γminθy − θA
(
α + (1− α)yθ) 1θ
1− θ − x, (29)
Kˆ = A
(
α + (1− α)yθ) 1θ − x− γminy, (30)
(31)
On the BGP all variables must grow at the same rate, such that g ≡ Cˆ = Mˆ = Kˆ. We
then find that, on the BGP the new variables x and y are given by
x = σ
(
ρ− Aαθ
[ ( γ
A(1−α)
) θ
1−θ(
γ
A(1−α)
) θ
1−θ − (1− α)
] 1−θ
θ
)
+ Aαθ
[ ( γ
A(1−α)
) θ
1−θ(
γ
A(1−α)
) θ
1−θ − (1− α)
] 1
θ
−γα 1θ
[(
γ
A(1− α)
) θ
1−θ
− (1− α)
]− 1
θ
, (32)
y = α1/θ
[(
γ
(1− α)A
) θ
1−θ
− (1− α)
]−1/θ
. (33)
Therefore, on the BGP, all variables grow at the rate
g = σ
(
Aαθ
[ ( γ
A(1−α)
) θ
1−θ(
γ
A(1−α)
) θ
1−θ − (1− α)
] 1−θ
θ
− ρ
)
. (34)
Comparative static exercises show that dg/dγ < 0, suggesting that a larger cost of the
energy substitute lowers the growth rate on the BGP as one would expect. Indeed, one
can calculate that the level of γ which leads to a negative growth rate in consumption is
exactly the same as that obtained in equation (16). Thus, the previous long-run results
carry through to the endogenous learning-by-using case.
However, we are still interested in whether consumption is monotonic or not during
transition, that means whether the existence of an energy substitute with learning-by-
using implies sustainability. For this we shall simulate the transition period under several
scenarios that only differ in their respective impacts of the learning-by-using on the cost
of the energy substitute.
Result 5 A costly energy substitute does not guarantee a monotonic consumption profile
despite the possibility of learning-by-using.
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This is shown in Figures 5 to 10, with different values of x reflecting different strengths of
learning (the lower is x the weaker is the learning). Figure 10 clearly shows that learning-
by-using may help in obtaining sustainability in comparison to an exogenously given level
of γ (case x = 0). However, we also see that consumption can be non-monotonic. Since
we start to use the energy substitute now earlier, this implies that we reduce the capital
stock since the substitute is too expensive. However, with a higher capacity use the agent
learns and therefore the costs of the energy substitute diminish, which eventually leads to
a situation where the costs may be low enough to imply endogenous growth.
> Figures 5 to 10 about here <
4 Conclusion
In this article we investigate the impact of a costly energy substitute on the sustainability
of consumption and on the transition between non-renewable and renewable resources.
We can summarize our results as follows.
Due to the cost structures it is never optimal to use both non-renewable resources and
the costly substitute at the same time. Indeed, we show that the non-renewable resource
will be used until becomes efficient to shift to the costly substitute, or never at all. We
also derive that if the non-renewable resource gets used then it will be fully depleted at
the time of the switch. The time of the switch is analyzed numerically and we find that the
switching time increases convexly with the level of the cost of the substitute. We also find
that initially poorer countries should shift towards the costly substitute later than richer
ones. Finally, the non-renewable resource may be depleted non-monotonically (u-shaped
extraction) depending on whether the savings ratio exceeds the elasticity of substitution
or not.
We then investigate learning-by-using. In that case the energy substitute will, in gen-
eral, be used earlier than if costs are exogenously given. This opens up a great deal of
possible policy implications. For example, firms which are producing in a competitive
structure may not be able to invest in a technology which is too costly now and therefore
when the non-renewable resources are depleted, the substitutes may be too expensive.
This point therefore gives support to the current subsidy policies that we see everywhere.
Helping firms to bring energy substitutes on the market via subsidies implies that when
the non-renewable resources will be finally used up, the substitutes may be cheap enough
to guarantee long-run growth.
We notice that the costs of the energy substitute is crucial for the sustainability of
consumption and derive explicit conditions under which optimal consumption may be
non-declining. We then investigate the role of learning-by-using in the energy substitute
for the sustainability of consumption and the transition between the resources. Our result
is that learning-by-using may help sustainability but it does not guarantee it. Though it is
more likely that learning-by-using may lead to endogenous growth due to its effect on the
cost of the energy substitute, during the transition period consumption may be changing
in a non-monotonic fashion.
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Another relevant result is that countries, which are very poor, are less likely to consider
the impact of learning. This suggests that current wealth plays a significant role when it
comes to evaluating future options. Richer countries whose inhabitants do not live on the
brink of starvation will be more inclined to rely on the non-renewable resource and when
it is finally depleted they might be faced with a cost of the energy substitute which is too
high for a sustainable path of consumption.
5 Appendix
We use the following configurations for the simulations. Simulations are done over a
horizon of 250 time periods. Utility is of the constant relative risk aversion type with
σ = 0.5. Production is a CES function with a distribution parameter of α = 0.33, total
factor productivity of A = 1. In the baseline cases γ is kept constant and varied between
1.3 and 1.8. When γ is endogenous we choose the functional form (γmin+1/(1+xB(t))).
We assume gmin = 0.4 and vary x from 0 to 0.0014. Initial conditions are S(0) = 200
and K(0) = 0.2, the discount rate is chosen at ρ = 0.03 and the elasticity of substitution
in the production function is θ = −1.
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Figure 1: The switching time as a function of γ and K(0)
6 Figures
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Figure 2: Non-renewable resource flow
Figure 3: Evolution of consumption
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Figure 4: Evolution of the capital stock
Figure 5: Costs of the energy substitute under learning-by-using
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Figure 6: Cumulative substitute use under learning-by-using
Figure 7: Renewable resource under learning-by-using
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Figure 8: Non-renewable resource under learning-by-using
Figure 9: Capital stock under learning-by-using
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Figure 10: Consumption under learning-by-using
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